預算赤字對於總體經濟變數的影響效果既是未定的，甚至也可能在某些狀況下如李嘉圖等值理論所強調的無影響；因此重點可能不在於預算的融通方式，而是預算的規模與支出結構。政府預算規模大小影響到國家總資源的配置效率，以及政府支出型態（如資本支出比例）影響到國家資本的形成，直接對於總體經濟表現造成衝擊。至於政府預算資金融通方式係採租稅、公債或貨幣，其效果如何？顯然仍存有許多的爭議。
因此，政府是否可以不重視預算赤字？而將預算赤字皆以債務融通方式進行，盡量避免採行容易產生政治成本的增稅方式。然而，為何OECD國家在1980年代以來，即致力於預算赤字與支出規模的控制呢？
依OECD出版的Managing Structural Deficit Reduction(1996)一書，指出基本總體經濟目標是促成各國致力於對抗財政失衡的原動力，這目標在於避免鉅額的預算赤字影響私部門的儲蓄與投資，即所謂的排擠效果與高利率。部份國家如紐西蘭、義大利、與土耳其則更強調金融市場的紀律。Grossman(1999)認為赤字問題會受各國重視的原因為：傳統財政理論仍具影響力、擔心政府公債排斥民間投資、以及政府因龐大債務而信用破產。
茲以為可以歸納有下列因素：
對赤字的根深蒂固觀念：即政府應在和平與經濟繁榮時限制支出，維持預算賸餘，而只有在戰爭與經濟景氣衰退時，可以容許預算赤字與舉債。
公債的排擠效果問題：政府公債會在資金市場與民間競奪資金，排斥私人投資，而一般相信私人投資的效益大於政府的效益。
政治上的支持度問題：預算赤字將失去人民的政治支持度，反之，預算賸餘較容易討好選民。
對政府公共支出的信心問題：預算赤字代表政府支出的無限制膨脹，以及不經濟支出。
理性選擇問題：長期的預算赤字，意謂著政府最終仍將會增稅以籌措償債財源，因此赤字代表未來的負擔加重。
金融信心問題：政府債務無限制的膨脹，即使未導致政府信用的破產。亦終會失去人民以及外國投資者的信心，減少投資。
from 預算赤字控制問題研究 徐仁輝（世新大學行政管理系副教授，行政院財政改革委員會委員）
10.19.2008
各國預算赤字成為常態 why?
為何支出成長幅度如此快速而收入成長緩慢，茲歸納有下列原因：
政府介入穩定經濟
自1930年代經濟大恐慌起，凱因斯理論所主張的「功能財政」(functional finance)盛行，50與60年代更是所謂「凱因斯的黃金時代」，各國政府每遇經濟衰退，即採行赤字預算，以擴大有效需求，長期以來縮短衰退期，犧牲的成本是通貨膨脹，以及政府支出不斷成長。1973到1974年的石油危機造成停滯性膨脹，各國政府仍依凱因斯學派主張不斷增加支出，赤字幅度因而更形加大。
社會安全與福利制度
1960年代以來各國不斷的擴大各項社會計畫，包括社會安全制度（年金計畫）、殘障福利、社會救助、失業保險、與醫療保險等，這些利益支付成為一種所謂的「應享權益支出」(entitlement)，不受到政府財政情況好壞的影響，而是法定必須支出，與一般政務或資本支出的預算程序皆不同。這些支出隨著人口結構的老化、以及失業人口增加，而逐年呈現快速成長趨勢。
經濟成長率的趨緩
自1970年代以來OECD國家經濟成長率皆普遍趨緩，失業率上升，造成的影響是政府支出增加，而稅收成長有限。
公共選擇
公共選擇學派觀察到選民對政策的理性無知，經常低估政府支出的機會成本，同時反對加稅，如最有名的加州13號提案。政客們為了選票，偏好採取阻力較少的公債融通方式，因此預算赤字不斷。
共同財悲劇問題
政府預算資源有限，行政官僚、利益團體、政策、或其他關係人莫不以爭取預算為目標，不爭取則為其他人或團體所爭取，因此政府預算先天具共同財悲劇問題特徵，支出自然趨於不斷膨脹，難以刪減
from 預算赤字控制問題研究 徐仁輝（世新大學行政管理系副教授，行政院財政改革委員會委員）
政府介入穩定經濟
自1930年代經濟大恐慌起，凱因斯理論所主張的「功能財政」(functional finance)盛行，50與60年代更是所謂「凱因斯的黃金時代」，各國政府每遇經濟衰退，即採行赤字預算，以擴大有效需求，長期以來縮短衰退期，犧牲的成本是通貨膨脹，以及政府支出不斷成長。1973到1974年的石油危機造成停滯性膨脹，各國政府仍依凱因斯學派主張不斷增加支出，赤字幅度因而更形加大。
社會安全與福利制度
1960年代以來各國不斷的擴大各項社會計畫，包括社會安全制度（年金計畫）、殘障福利、社會救助、失業保險、與醫療保險等，這些利益支付成為一種所謂的「應享權益支出」(entitlement)，不受到政府財政情況好壞的影響，而是法定必須支出，與一般政務或資本支出的預算程序皆不同。這些支出隨著人口結構的老化、以及失業人口增加，而逐年呈現快速成長趨勢。
經濟成長率的趨緩
自1970年代以來OECD國家經濟成長率皆普遍趨緩，失業率上升，造成的影響是政府支出增加，而稅收成長有限。
公共選擇
公共選擇學派觀察到選民對政策的理性無知，經常低估政府支出的機會成本，同時反對加稅，如最有名的加州13號提案。政客們為了選票，偏好採取阻力較少的公債融通方式，因此預算赤字不斷。
共同財悲劇問題
政府預算資源有限，行政官僚、利益團體、政策、或其他關係人莫不以爭取預算為目標，不爭取則為其他人或團體所爭取，因此政府預算先天具共同財悲劇問題特徵，支出自然趨於不斷膨脹，難以刪減
from 預算赤字控制問題研究 徐仁輝（世新大學行政管理系副教授，行政院財政改革委員會委員）
10.12.2008
Stephen Colbert, on ‘The Colbert Report,’ Oct. 6
"Nation, what a debate last Thursday! Both candidates surpassed expectations. Sarah Palin proved she could speak, and Joe Biden proved he could stop speaking."
世界厚望中日投放美元解救金融危机
朝鮮日報記者 金起勛 (2008.10.11 10:37) 目前全世界都在期待作為外匯儲備大國的中國和日本以及擁有丰富的“石油美元”的中東能夠發揮作用。有分析指出，只有這些國家向國際金融市場投放美元，才能解決資金困難，并且能夠穩定金融危机。
据《日本經濟新聞》10日報道，日本政府正在研究在國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）制定“緊急融資制度”，其內容包括，由日本和中國等外匯儲備大國向因美元不足而陷入困境的國家進行支援。這一构想將在華盛頓舉行的七國集團（G7）財長和央行總裁會議上提出。
日本擁有9800億美元的外匯儲備，其規模僅次于擁有1.8万億美元的中國。另外，印度和中東產油國也擁有大量美元。該報稱，日本計划除中國外，還將敦促中東產油國參与這一制度。
日本提出這一緊急方案是因為用原來的IMF援助制度，根本無法滿足因金融危机擴大而增加的美元需求。從冰島的情況來看，由于需要向金融机构投入的公共資金不足，國家已面臨破產。另外，巴基斯坦由于對外流動性情況大幅惡化，信用評級机构標准普爾（S&P）將其國家信用等級下調至國家被怀疑面臨破產的“CCC+”等級。
另外，据中國媒体最近報道，中國正在考慮向美國支援外匯儲備。据報道，中國計划購買2000億美元美國國債。就是說，如果美國為籌措7000億美元救市基金，要求中國給予幫助，中國將接受美國的要求。中國已經成為美國國債的最大“買家”。
中國在本月8日与美國、英國、加拿大、瑞典、瑞士等國家同步降息，正積极參与國際合作。
据《日本經濟新聞》10日報道，日本政府正在研究在國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）制定“緊急融資制度”，其內容包括，由日本和中國等外匯儲備大國向因美元不足而陷入困境的國家進行支援。這一构想將在華盛頓舉行的七國集團（G7）財長和央行總裁會議上提出。
日本擁有9800億美元的外匯儲備，其規模僅次于擁有1.8万億美元的中國。另外，印度和中東產油國也擁有大量美元。該報稱，日本計划除中國外，還將敦促中東產油國參与這一制度。
日本提出這一緊急方案是因為用原來的IMF援助制度，根本無法滿足因金融危机擴大而增加的美元需求。從冰島的情況來看，由于需要向金融机构投入的公共資金不足，國家已面臨破產。另外，巴基斯坦由于對外流動性情況大幅惡化，信用評級机构標准普爾（S&P）將其國家信用等級下調至國家被怀疑面臨破產的“CCC+”等級。
另外，据中國媒体最近報道，中國正在考慮向美國支援外匯儲備。据報道，中國計划購買2000億美元美國國債。就是說，如果美國為籌措7000億美元救市基金，要求中國給予幫助，中國將接受美國的要求。中國已經成為美國國債的最大“買家”。
中國在本月8日与美國、英國、加拿大、瑞典、瑞士等國家同步降息，正積极參与國際合作。
10.05.2008
理解金融風暴的另一個角度
Thursday, Sep. 25, 2008
America's No. 1 Export: Debt
By Justin Fox
Japan and Germany make cars. Saudi Arabia pumps oil. China supplies the world with socks and toys and flat-screen TVs. What does the United States produce? Lots of stuff, but in recent years this country's No. 1 export--by far--has been debt.
When you look at things this way, it becomes clearer what the frenzy in New York City and Washington is all about. There are major quality issues with our nation's flagship product. The authorities have acknowledged the problem--"This is a humbling, humbling time for the United States of America" is how Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson put it in one TV interview. So now Paulson & Co. are recalling defective financial products en masse, slapping GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT labels on some of them and replacing others outright with U.S. treasuries.
It's textbook crisis management, similar to Johnson & Johnson's famously forthright and successful reaction to the Tylenol tampering scare of 1982. So far, so good. But while Johnson & Johnson was soon able to restore Tylenol's lost market share, the U.S. faces a different challenge.
Our quandary is that we are apparently not capable of safely manufacturing $700 billion in debt securities to sell to foreigners every year, as we've been doing since 2005. (That this is the same total as Treasury's bailout plan is just a coincidence.) If we keep trying to borrow that much from overseas--as you've probably gathered, selling debt means borrowing money--today's quality problems may soon seem petty. For now, we can still reassure buyers around the world by slapping that GUARANTEED label on our debt. But as financial crisis and economic slowdown cause government debts to burgeon, and as commitments to Social Security and Medicare loom closer as baby boomers retire, that confidence could easily fade.
So while today's crisis management makes a certain amount of sense, returning to the borrow-and-spend status quo afterward seems like a disastrous idea. If the U.S. is to have a future as an economic power, its long love affair with borrowed money has to end. Right? "I hesitate to say yes, because people--including me--have been saying that it had to come to an end now for years, and it hasn't," says R. Taggart Murphy, an expert on global capital flows who teaches at the University of Tsukuba's business school in Tokyo. Then he adds, "It looks pretty clearly like we're in the endgame right now."
This country's move into big-time debt exports began with the big-time government deficits of the early 1980s--which had to be financed by somebody. "The Reagan Revolution was essentially an experiment in seeing how much money America could borrow from overseas," says Murphy, who at the time was an investment banker in Tokyo. The answer was lots. Guided by Murphy and his ilk, Japan snapped up U.S. treasuries and other debt, keeping interest rates here from exploding as many had feared.
In the early 1990s, as the U.S. got its fiscal house in order, the capital inflows from overseas shrank. Late in the decade, they returned, with a twist: foreign investors and companies were buying into corporate America to get in on an economic boom. That boom ended in 2001. But the Bush Administration soon began running deficits, and foreigners discovered an American financial product to which they'd never paid much heed before: mortgage securities.
The result was a staggering increase in capital inflows. The inevitable flip side was a staggering rise in the current account deficit--basically, the trade deficit plus a few other things. It grew from $114 billion in 1995 to $417 billion in 2000 to a record $788 billion in 2006 before falling to $731 billion, or 5% of GDP, last year. Political discussion of this shortfall usually focuses on trade agreements and exchange rates. But if the U.S. simply stopped borrowing so much--that is, if Washington balanced its budget and restrained financial companies from loading U.S. households with ever more debt--the current account deficit would evaporate.
The housing crash and resulting credit crunch are already forcing U.S. households to retrench. Government--fearing disaster if everybody retrenches at the same time--has stepped into the breach. Again, that makes sense in a crisis. But once the panic has passed, the U.S. will simply be steering toward another, even bigger, crisis unless it finds something to replace debt as its No. 1 export.
Of course, less money borrowed means less money to spend. "Can you imagine McCain or Obama going around saying he wants to reduce your standard of living?" asks Murphy. Probably not. But maybe they could just sell it as, say, diversifying our product offering.
America's No. 1 Export: Debt
By Justin Fox
Japan and Germany make cars. Saudi Arabia pumps oil. China supplies the world with socks and toys and flat-screen TVs. What does the United States produce? Lots of stuff, but in recent years this country's No. 1 export--by far--has been debt.
When you look at things this way, it becomes clearer what the frenzy in New York City and Washington is all about. There are major quality issues with our nation's flagship product. The authorities have acknowledged the problem--"This is a humbling, humbling time for the United States of America" is how Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson put it in one TV interview. So now Paulson & Co. are recalling defective financial products en masse, slapping GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT labels on some of them and replacing others outright with U.S. treasuries.
It's textbook crisis management, similar to Johnson & Johnson's famously forthright and successful reaction to the Tylenol tampering scare of 1982. So far, so good. But while Johnson & Johnson was soon able to restore Tylenol's lost market share, the U.S. faces a different challenge.
Our quandary is that we are apparently not capable of safely manufacturing $700 billion in debt securities to sell to foreigners every year, as we've been doing since 2005. (That this is the same total as Treasury's bailout plan is just a coincidence.) If we keep trying to borrow that much from overseas--as you've probably gathered, selling debt means borrowing money--today's quality problems may soon seem petty. For now, we can still reassure buyers around the world by slapping that GUARANTEED label on our debt. But as financial crisis and economic slowdown cause government debts to burgeon, and as commitments to Social Security and Medicare loom closer as baby boomers retire, that confidence could easily fade.
So while today's crisis management makes a certain amount of sense, returning to the borrow-and-spend status quo afterward seems like a disastrous idea. If the U.S. is to have a future as an economic power, its long love affair with borrowed money has to end. Right? "I hesitate to say yes, because people--including me--have been saying that it had to come to an end now for years, and it hasn't," says R. Taggart Murphy, an expert on global capital flows who teaches at the University of Tsukuba's business school in Tokyo. Then he adds, "It looks pretty clearly like we're in the endgame right now."
This country's move into big-time debt exports began with the big-time government deficits of the early 1980s--which had to be financed by somebody. "The Reagan Revolution was essentially an experiment in seeing how much money America could borrow from overseas," says Murphy, who at the time was an investment banker in Tokyo. The answer was lots. Guided by Murphy and his ilk, Japan snapped up U.S. treasuries and other debt, keeping interest rates here from exploding as many had feared.
In the early 1990s, as the U.S. got its fiscal house in order, the capital inflows from overseas shrank. Late in the decade, they returned, with a twist: foreign investors and companies were buying into corporate America to get in on an economic boom. That boom ended in 2001. But the Bush Administration soon began running deficits, and foreigners discovered an American financial product to which they'd never paid much heed before: mortgage securities.
The result was a staggering increase in capital inflows. The inevitable flip side was a staggering rise in the current account deficit--basically, the trade deficit plus a few other things. It grew from $114 billion in 1995 to $417 billion in 2000 to a record $788 billion in 2006 before falling to $731 billion, or 5% of GDP, last year. Political discussion of this shortfall usually focuses on trade agreements and exchange rates. But if the U.S. simply stopped borrowing so much--that is, if Washington balanced its budget and restrained financial companies from loading U.S. households with ever more debt--the current account deficit would evaporate.
The housing crash and resulting credit crunch are already forcing U.S. households to retrench. Government--fearing disaster if everybody retrenches at the same time--has stepped into the breach. Again, that makes sense in a crisis. But once the panic has passed, the U.S. will simply be steering toward another, even bigger, crisis unless it finds something to replace debt as its No. 1 export.
Of course, less money borrowed means less money to spend. "Can you imagine McCain or Obama going around saying he wants to reduce your standard of living?" asks Murphy. Probably not. But maybe they could just sell it as, say, diversifying our product offering.
10.02.2008
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